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Because developing countries' comparative advantage is seen to lie in agriculture, the 
protectionist agricultural policies in OECD countries are often criticized for preventing developing 
countries benefiting from world trade (Oxfam, 2005).  Many studies suggest that developing countries 
will reap most of the benefits of trade liberalization, and that the gains for them would be considerable 
if an ambitious Doha agreement brought about freer trade (Hertel et al 2003; World Bank 2004).  
However, recent studies suggest that the positive effects of the elimination of Northern 
agricultural subsidies, particularly for the least developed countries (LDCs) might have been 
overestimated (Panagaryia, 2005).  OECD countries have much to gain from winding down the heavy 
protection they provide to their own farmers, but the high expectations that this will lead to a dramatic 
improvement in trade opportunities for the poorest farmers in developing countries seems misplaced.  
The very large gains for developing countries predicted by some models have been criticized on the 
grounds that they were largely driven by particular assumptions on market equilibrium (labor) and 
inaccurate tariff data, and that excessive country aggregation hid the contrasting fortunes of different 
developing country groups (Bouët et al 2005a).  The fact that many modelers use the same set of data 
and parameters encouraged an illusion of consensus regarding the magnitude of the benefits of trade 
liberalization, which are now revised downwards.  Typically, simulations of a Doha agreement on 
agriculture (which would only bring partial liberalization) now suggest welfare changes for developing 
countries that range between a loss of 2 billion US dollars a year (Bouët et al 2005a) to a gain of some 
9 billion dollars (Anderson and Martin 2005).  These results are far below the estimates that were 
published only a few months earlier by most institutions.  
It is also becoming apparent that the consequences of agricultural liberalization for developing 
countries are complex, and that claims that developing countries as a whole would reap the main 
benefits are misplaced.  The consequences of a Doha agreement on agriculture will be uneven both 
between countries and between economic agents (typically consumers and agricultural producers).  
This raises questions about the strategies to minimize the losses, for ethical reasons as much as to 
gather a consensus to support the multilateral process.  Some of the losses experienced by developing 
countries result from the erosion of existing preferential access to EU and US markets.  The ability of 
"special and differential treatment" for developing countries (a principle underlying all World Trade 
Organization agreements) to cushion potential negative effects, including a possible extension of non-
reciprocal preferences for the most vulnerable countries, requires more examination.  
In this paper, we take a closer look at the effects of the Doha agricultural negotiations on 
developing countries.  We try to distinguish the different effects at stake and to identify the 
consequences for different country groups.  We also analyze the separate impact of the different policy 
instruments, such as export subsidies, domestic support and tariff protection.  We find that, while 
export subsidies lead to market distortions, their elimination will not bring the large gains that some 
non governmental organizations expect.  By focusing mainly on tariffs, international organizations 
might underestimate the potential gains of eliminating farm subsidies in developed countries, 
especially in sectors such as cotton.  Indeed, the role of tariff reductions must be nuanced because of 
existing preferential access for developing countries.  We show that, in the agricultural sector, the non-
reciprocal preferences granted so as to encourage "trade as aid" are well-utilized, even though the 
benefits are limited for the poorest countries because of supply side and non-tariff constraints.   
Overall, we believe that a further step in special and differential measures is needed to take account of 
the negative effects of the agricultural negotiations on selected countries, even though greater 
differentiation between developing countries faces conceptual, legal and political obstacles.  Another 
conclusion is that agricultural issues should not be the exclusive focus of pro-development efforts.  
Several other topics, such as non-agricultural market access, "mode 4" of trade in services (temporary 
movements of natural persons) or even competition policy, might be worth further consideration.  
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2. Agricultural protectionism in developed countries 
The extent of agricultural protection.  The agricultural protectionism of the Northern countries 
has long been denounced by developing countries.  However, the results of impact studies are 
contradictory, and reflect some of the agenda of the different parties in the multilateral negotiations. 
For example, the Cairns Group and the United States emphasize the effects of "fortress Europe" on 
poor countries, while the European Commission stresses how the EU tariff structure allows it to 
import some eight times more agricultural foodstuffs from developing countries than Australia and the 
United States combined.  Technical difficulties have fuelled the controversy on the actual level of 
agricultural protection.  The simple measure of duty on agricultural products yields varying figures 
depending on the type of average used (trade weighted or not), and whether one focuses on bound or 
applied tariffs. For example, different authors provide estimates of the EU average tariff for 
agricultural products ranging from 10% to 40%, the figures by Gallezot (2003) contrasting with those 
of Messerlin (2001) (See Bureau and Salvatici 2004 for a comparison). 
Bound tariffs negotiated at the WTO represent commitments on maximum tariffs, but much lower 
tariffs are sometimes applied, especially by developing and transition economies.  In the case of the 
EU, lower tariffs are applied under preferential agreements and tariff rate quotas.  Of the 150 members 
of the WTO, only ten do not benefit from some form of preference from the EU.  The others, including 
all developing countries, can export to the EU with zero or reduced tariffs on at least certain products.  
The United States also has numerous preferential regimes, arising either from free trade agreements or 
in the framework of non-reciprocal regimes (African Growth Opportunity Act –AGOA, Caribbean 
Basin Economic Recovery Act, etc.).  Every developed country also grants non-reciprocal preferences 
to developing countries within the framework of the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP).  For 
this reason, the level of agricultural protection in a given country is not very meaningful per se.  It 
must be gauged relative to the structure of exports from each country, and this requires bilateral 
measures of applied tariffs, which were made available only recently (Bouët et al, 2004).  The use of 
such measures shows that obstacles to exports from developing countries are significant in Japan, 
where preferential systems have only a limited effect in agriculture.  The protection level is also higher 
in the European Union than in the United States (Bureau and Salvatici, 2004).  Protection is 
concentrated in a few sectors in the United States (sugar, dairy, tobacco) and more so in Canada 
(dairy).  It is more widespread across products in the European Union.  Indirect protection through 
subsidies is also pernicious, as in the case of cotton in the United States.  Assessing Australian 
protection is difficult as it is essentially non-tariff based (Fontagné and Mimouni 2001).  Finally, tariff 
protection is still high in developing countries, in particular in those that may represent a large market 
for other developing countries (India, and, in some sectors, China).  
Table 1 provides an estimate of applied tariffs for different agricultural sectors, for groups of 
countries.  It shows that protection remains very high in some agricultural sectors, particularly in 
Europe and Asia, including for products of significant interest for developing countries, such as sugar.  
Table 2 also shows that Northern agricultural protection does not have the same effects on every 
developing country.  The protectionist nature of the European Union, for example, affects particularly 
South American and Asian exporters which face average tariffs of between 14-18 per cent.  However, 
African and Mediterranean countries face a lower tariff (6.7 and 7.3 per cent, respectively) because 
they can export to the EU under more generous preferential agreements than, say, Brazil or Thailand.  
This less unfavorable treatment of African exports is common to all major importers.  Recent work 
also shows that most Asian and South American developing countries face particularly high tariffs for 
processed food products, which encourages exports of raw materials rather than processed ones.  This 
issue of tariff escalation is much less severe for sub Saharan African exports to EU markets, again 
because of the existing preferences under the Cotonou or Everything But Arms schemes (Bureau et al 
2004).   
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The cost of agricultural protectionism for developing countries.  Even though better data on 
applied tariffs has led to a downward revision of some earlier estimates, agricultural protectionism in 
the North still significantly restricts exports from developing countries.  OECD agricultural 
protectionism costs developing countries some 26 billion dollars (while the protectionism of Southern 
countries costs slightly more) according to Anderson and Martin (2005).  Other studies find gains in 
the order of 4 to 8 billion dollars annually for developing countries if developed countries fully opened 
their agricultural markets (Diao et al 2004; Tokarick, 2003), and gains of about 1 to 3.5 billion dollars 
in the case of a lowering by half of the agricultural tariffs in developed countries (Francois et al 2005, 
for example).  These net estimates are modest, when expressed as a percentage of GDP.  They rely on 
welfare measures, and take into account all impacts, including possible unfavorable effects for 
consumers linked to price rises.  The cost of agricultural protectionism is larger if attention is focused 
on developing country farmers alone. 
However, the gains from a cut in multilateral tariffs would be limited, if not negative, for the 
countries that already benefit from reduced tariffs.  Bouët et al (2005a) find that sub-Saharan Africa 
suffers more from the domestic support policies of developed countries (cotton in particular) than from 
their tariff structure due to their preferential access to the EU and US markets.   Eliminating 
multilateral tariffs in developed countries would actually have negative effects on African countries 
because these countries would face more competition from, say, Australia or Brazil on the EU market.  
More generally, the reduction in multilateral tariffs in developed countries would generate an erosion 
of preferences detrimental to sub-Saharan African, Caribbean countries and LDCs in general.  These 
results, echoed by those of Laird et al (2004), temper optimism about the effects of a multilateral 
reduction of tariffs for developing countries as a whole, by highlighting the negative consequences of 
agricultural liberalization for a set of countries that includes some of the poorest ones.  
 
3. Preferences granted to developing countries 
Preferential market access.  Developed countries have granted non-reciprocal preferences to 
particular sets of developing countries, which often reflect particular political or historical links.   
These preferences explain some of the uneven consequences of multilateral liberalization.  If sub-
Saharan Africa risks not benefiting much from lowered tariffs in a multilateral framework, it is 
because it benefits from preferential access to the European market under the Cotonou Agreement 
with African-Caribbean-Pacific countries (ACP) and to the US market under the AGOA (African 
Growth and Opportunity Act).  Most other countries only benefit from the GSP, which has limited 
coverage for agricultural produce (the GSP nevertheless provides a much larger product coverage for 
LDCs, especially in the United States, and in the European Union under the specific component, the 
Everything But Arms initiative). 
Preferences designed to offer commercial opportunities to developing countries are much 
criticized.  Preferences are said to be poorly utilized, in part because the rules of origin governing 
eligibility are restrictive thus largely limiting their benefits (Brenton, 2003).  Preferences are often tied 
to restrictive or debatable conditions, subject to frequent changes, and therefore fail to provide the 
stable environment necessary to develop production (Panagaryia, 2003).  They are accused of 
providing incentives for a country to specialize in products for which it has no comparative advantage.  
Preferences are also said to divert trade between developing countries and to create as many losers as 
winners.  It is claimed that preferences have no or even a negative effect on growth and delay growth-
promoting reforms (Ozden and Reinhardt, 2003; Topp, 2003).  Finally, preferences are also under 
attack in the World Trade Organization (WTO) as contradicting the basic normative principle of non-
discrimination.    5
Some of the criticisms of preferences seem less substantiated in agriculture than in other sectors.  
This is the case of the underutilization of the preferences, and the baneful effect of rules of origin.  
Other criticisms nevertheless apply.  
The utilization of preferences in agriculture.  Recent studies by OECD (2005a) and Wainio et al 
(2005) show that, contrary to a widespread belief, commercial preferences granted to developing 
countries by the European Union and the United States are rather well utilized for agricultural 
products.  Among exports from developing countries, those eligible are essentially exported under 
these preferences.  It is the case that, when examined in isolation, the apparent rate of utilization of a 
particular preference can appear low.  For example, apparently only 43 per cent of eligible Andean 
country exports to the US enter under the Andean Trade Preferences Act, and for LDCs, less than 21 
per cent of eligible exports benefit from the GSP-LDCs scheme (Table 3). However, once it is 
recognized that many of these eligible exports take advantage of other preferential schemes, the 
effective rate of utilization is much higher.  In both the EU and the US, only a small share (about 11% 
and 13% respectively, see Tables 3 and 4) of eligible agricultural products were exported outside a 
preferential regime.  These rare cases of eligible exports under the Most Favored Nation (MFN) 
regime are largely explained by small trade flows and/or low MFN tariffs which means that the 
importer did not judge it worthwhile to meet the eligibility criteria (OECD 2005a).  In all other cases, 
a product eligible for a given preferential regime will be imported either under this regime, or under an 
alternative regime providing similar advantages.  Studies inferring poor use of preferences might be 
valid in other sectors such as textiles but they are not supported by the available data for the 
agricultural, food and fisheries sector.  
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Some preferential regimes granted to developing countries appear more generous than others.  
Table 3 and Table 4 show that when exporters have the choice between two preferential regimes, they 
tend to favor particular agreements such as Cotonou for the European Union or the Caribbean Basin 
agreements for the United States.  The apparent utilization rates for these agreements are much higher 
than for the GSP schemes, for example.  The main explanation is that agreements such as Cotonou 
impose less administrative constraints, or are more flexible regarding the origin of the material used as 
inputs to exports than competing agreements.  In the case of the United States, the GSP is also less 
predictable and has a shorter term horizon than the Caribbean Basin and Central America preferences.  
Rules of origin.  The criticisms of preferential regimes are less substantiated in agriculture than in 
other sectors with respect to rules of origin.  Such rules have been shown to impose considerable 
constraints on would-be users of preferences, for example, in the textile industry (Brenton 2003, 
Inama 2003).  In the food sector, the problem is less severe, perhaps because a large proportion of the 
exports of developing countries are primary goods not affected by the rules governing origins of 
components or intermediate inputs.  In most cases, other obstacles (technical standards, poor 
infrastructure) appear more restrictive than rules of origin in the food sector, if we are to believe 
enquiries carried out among processors by Bureau et al (2004) and by OECD (2005a).  
However, a number of small countries experience problems justifying enough local content when 
it comes to exporting processed foods.  Stevens and Kennan (2004) raise this issue for several sub 
Saharan African countries.  In the fisheries sector, they stress the difficulties for countries with a small 
maritime domain to supply processing plants all year round, given that origin is linked to the catching 
regions.  In such cases, rules of origin do limit the benefit of preferential access.  A particular problem 
posed by EU rules of origin is the lack of cumulation among countries that benefit from the GSP, 
except within a handful of regional groupings.  Allowing further cumulation (i.e. considering material 
used by country A and originating from country B as "local" provided that country A and B are both 
eligible for the EU preference) would make it easier to make use of the GSP.  In the case of the 
Everything But Arms initiative, which as part of the GSP is subject to the same restrictions,  6
cumulation with all other developing (and perhaps all neighboring) countries would be necessary, 
since cumulation would bring little practical advantage if it were restricted to other LDCs.  In the 
United States, the rules of origin impose a value added content requirement, but also traceability of the 
material purchased, which requires significant compliance costs for countries where the production 
sector is fragmented and lacks administrative capacity. 
Other limitations of preferential regimes.  Some other criticisms of preferences apply to the 
agricultural sector.  It is true that some countries have developed industries on which they are now 
very dependent in areas where they have little comparative advantage (sugar in Barbados, bananas in 
the Windward islands, etc.).  Note, however, that this occurred because preferences were granted for a 
limited number of products only, or were particularly large for these products and not for others (the 
EU sugar and banana protocols under the ACP agreements).  With a broader set of preferences, this 
issue is not as much of a problem.  
A criticism of preferences is that they simply divert trade.  Preferences are, by nature, a source of 
trade diversion, and it is understood and accepted that, say, the GSP diverts trade towards developing 
countries.  However, trade diversion occurs also between developing countries.  Countries such as 
Brazil and India complain about the benefits granted to sub Saharan Africa under the Cotonou 
agreement.  Caribbean countries expressed strong criticisms when the EU adopted the Everything But 
Arms initiative, fearing competition for their banana and sugar exports.  Sri Lanka complains about 
losing market share to Bangladesh because of the EU and US GSP for LDCs. 
The particular trade diversion between developing countries generated by the present 
configuration of preferences lacks justification.  Some non reciprocal preferences are characterized by 
arbitrariness.  The EU preferences seem tied to historical and colonial links and the US ones are 
dependent on geo-political aspects.  However, there is a stronger justification for providing a specific 
treatment for countries that cannot pull themselves out of a poverty trap, or which have consistently 
failed to take advantage of trade liberalization (Cline, 2004).  LDCs fall into these categories and, as 
Cline shows, the entire sub-Saharan Africa is also in a situation that calls for particular measures, 
compared to most Asian countries.  Preferences based on a formula taking account of the degree of a 
country’s development are more defensible.  When provided to the poorest countries, preferences are 
unlikely to result in large negative effects for other developing countries: the Everything But Arms 
initiative has not generated significant trade diversion from developing countries (Yu and Jensen, 
2005).  A concomitant increase of trade with other developing countries (intra-LDCs in particular) has 
even been observed.  Although it is difficult to establish a causal link, it has been suggested that 
preferential access to the EU has helped to build export capacities and had a spillover effect (Gallezot 
and Bureau, 2005). 
The most relevant objection to granting preferential access to developing countries in agriculture 
is perhaps that it is difficult to agree on eligibility criteria.  The per capita income is an obvious 
indicator to use in deciding which country should be eligible for preferences.  However, countries that 
are only slightly less poor than, say, the LDCs which are granted preferences, would suffer from a 
threshold effect.  Another point is that agricultural preferences are likely to lose significant value in 
the future, because of the decrease in multilateral tariffs, and the reform of domestic policies, for 
example in the EU and US sugar sectors.  
Are preferences ineffective in the agricultural sector and would their erosion be harmless?  
Table 5 shows that preferential regimes for developing countries account for a significant share of the 
imports of agricultural and food products (20%) into the EU.  They account for 12% of all US imports 
in this sector, but it is noteworthy that a large share of imports is subject to a zero MFN duty.   
However, the preferences granted to very poor countries fail to generate large trade flows: in spite of 
the absence of quotas and tariffs, the EU Everything But Arms initiative only represents 0.4% of EU 
agricultural and food imports (though many eligible imports enter duty free under competing 
agreements).  The US African Growth Opportunity Act represents only 0.2% of US food imports, and 
most of them come from South Africa.  From this perspective, the impact of the preferences granted to 
the poorest countries is disappointing.    7
The explanation for this is to be sought in problems of competitiveness or in poor compliance 
with sanitary standards or plant disease controls more so than in the side conditions of preferential 
agreements (OECD, 2005a).  For example, the Everything But Arms initiative led to considerable 
preferential margins in the animals and meat sectors, given the very high EU tariffs and the absence of 
coverage by the regular GSP for these products.  However, there has been no significant export to the 
EU, even though animals is a sector where LDCs have some significant export potential (live sheep 
and beef exported to the Middle East and to other developing countries).  Sanitary obstacles have 
prevented the large tariff cuts translating into exports to the European Union. 
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It is difficult to evaluate the impact of preferences on growth and development.  The European 
Commission itself expressed serious doubts about the benefits of the ACP preferential regime during 
the design of the Cotonou agreement.  However, statistical studies showing the ineffectiveness of 
preferences (Ozden and Reinhardt, 2003; Stockel and Borrell, 2001) are not particularly convincing.  
Perhaps the situation would have been much worse without preferences.  The Cotonou agreement and 
the GSP cover significant exports to the EU, and it is unclear whether such flows would take place 
without these preferential regimes.  Moreover, several recent studies contradict assertions of the 
ineffectiveness of preferences as development aid, at least in the agricultural sector.  In a very detailed 
study of African countries, Stevens and Kennan (2004) show that preferences in textiles but also in 
agriculture and fisheries "are used and work" on a global scale, and that the problems are caused more 
by the limitations of these preferences (limited product coverage, restrictive conditions, problems of 
technical standards imposed for tariff exemptions, etc.).  Clearly, some trade flows would not have 
taken place without these preferences.  This is confirmed by Wainio and Gehlhar (2004) who also 
show that exports from developing countries fell when preferences have been eroded by the lowering 
of US tariffs imposed on competing countries.  An econometric study conducted over a wide sample 
of countries even suggests that countries which benefit from the American and/or European GSP on 
average have experienced significant extra growth (Romalis, 2003).  
There remain important questions for which precise information is lacking.  This is true regarding 
the extent of the real benefits to developing countries, and more so for the sharing of these benefits.  
What exactly are the repercussions of the ACP agreements for various categories of the population? 
How are the preferential rents (including import quota rents) distributed?  What are the indirect effects 
(corruption) of import or export license allocation?  It is not known precisely if this "Trade as Aid" is 
more effective than more direct assistance policies, the consequences, for example of the EU banana 
and sugar protocols being controversial on this point.  However, excessive criticism of preferential 
regimes seems to be made in order to avoid the defense of preferences being used as an obstacle to 
multilateral liberalization.  By doing so, one takes the risk of depriving many developing countries of 
assistance which may be quite effective.  
In addition, skepticism about the benefit drawn from preferences does not imply that their 
removal would be harmless.  Various authors have argued that erosion of non-reciprocal preferences is 
a problem of limited magnitude at the worldwide level, focused on a handful of products and on a 
limited number of countries (see e.g. Subramanian, 2003).  Indeed, the losses generated by the erosion 
of preferences for LDCs are in line with the magnitude of their gains from those preferences, i.e. 
small.  The main losers are small island economies, and assistance can be targeted to mitigate the 
impact of preference erosion on these small-sized countries (Alexandraki and Lankes, 2004).   
However, Bouët et al (2005b) argue that the magnitude of forthcoming difficulties for poor countries 
has been understated.  According to their estimates, 14 countries earned in 2001 tariff quota rents 
worth more than half a percentage point of their GDP (more than one point in 8 countries). 
There is little original work on the actual allocation of the rents.  Borrell (1999) or Topp (2003) 
who suggest that the banana protocol brings almost no benefit to developing countries, while costing  8
much more to EU consumers, are often quoted.  However, as noted by FAO (2004), the authors 
provide little empirical justification or theoretical basis for their claims.  Some evidence suggests that, 
under the sugar protocol, countries such as Mozambique or the Windward Islands have managed to 
condition the attribution of licenses to the funding of public services or schools, and have therefore 
kept at least a fraction of the preferential rent.  In Guyana, the rent is estimated to amount to 10% of 
GDP and is the backbone of Guyanese economy (LMC, 2004).  The rent of sugar and orange juice 
preferences is described as having a significant positive impact on the expansion of some income-
generating sectors in Guyana and Belize (FAO, 2004).  Stevens (2003) shows that the allocation of 
quotas under the Cotonou sugar protocol provides some market power to the ACP countries when 
facing a trading firm, allowing them to keep some of the rent (he shows that a monopsonist in the 
sugar sector cannot play one supplier off against another as this firm does in other situations with no 
allocated quota). 
Bouet et al (2005b)’s calculation also shows that the "true" average preferential margin in 
agriculture is higher than 1 point for 47 developing countries, and higher than 2 points for 33 
countries.  Bouët et al stress that preferential schemes such as the EU-Cotonou Agreement or the US-
Caribbean Basin Initiative are of particular importance for beneficiary countries.  The erosion of 
preferences is likely to be a major challenge for several African and Caribbean countries, whose 
export specialization is in large part shaped by preferences. Sugar, bananas, textiles and clothing, and 
meat products figure largely in the preferences debate, but these products are key for several 
developing countries. 
Furthermore, the poor countries concerned generally have a very low adjustment capacity due to 
the combination of an often-deficient capital market, of the existence of many obstacles to labor 
mobility, of the absence of safety nets and of training capacities, etc.  They might well face severe 
difficulties when trying to reallocate part of their production factors toward other sectors.  Contraction 
of internal demand is often the only domestic way for them to adjust to external imbalances.  
 
4. The impact of domestic subsidies 
Tariffs are often seen as being the main issue that should be tackled by trade negotiators.   
Anderson and Martin (2005), for example, believe that 92% of the gains of agricultural liberalization 
will come from the reduction of tariffs, while the elimination or reform of agricultural subsidies would 
have only limited impact. However, the impact of domestic subsidies may not be as harmless as this 
figure suggests. 
The overall welfare effect may hide some large but contradictory effects that offset one another, 
generating losses in some food importing countries and gains in others.  The removal of EU and US 
agricultural subsidies may have significant consequences on the world price of some commodities.  
This is the case of the subsidies on cotton, tobacco and even soybeans.  Bouët et al (2005a) find, for 
example, that elimination of US payments to cotton producers would lead to a large increase in the 
world price (US exports amounting to some 40% of world trade).  Albeit contrasted across countries, 
the impact of EU and US domestic subsidies on developing countries should not be underestimated.  
With a significant cut in US and EU cotton subsidies, the share of Sub Saharan Africa in world trade 
could increase dramatically.  On the other hand, textile-producing countries that cannot produce cotton 
within their own borders could lose market shares in clothing to countries such as China, and suffer 
from deterioration in their terms of trade. 
It is more difficult to assess the impact of domestic subsidies in sectors where payments are less 
linked to production.  Recent agricultural policy reforms have been characterized by a move of farm 
support towards payments which are less tied to the quantity produced.  Payments coupled to 
production count for only marginal amounts in the European Union or in the United States in the 
cereal or meat sectors, for example.  As a result, "green box" payments (which, in WTO terms, refersto 
transfers to farmers which are not dependent on either current prices or the quantity produced) are now 
very large.   9
Some developing countries, backed by non governmental organizations such as Oxfam, argue that 
decoupling is only a cosmetic revamping of support which remains at the same level (Watkins, 2004).  
However, one cannot deny that decoupled payments are much less distorting than the former market 
price support and output subsidies.  The main question is perhaps whether EU and US payments are 
actually decoupled.  OECD estimates suggest that the combination of payments linked to production 
and market price support (i.e. "coupled") still exceeds the amount of transfers to producers that are 
genuinely decoupled.  In the EU, the decoupling is only partial, and the new "single farm payment" 
remains conditional on the maintenance of the land in good agricultural condition, even though it does 
not require actual production.  In the US, "countercyclical" payments top up some lump sump 
payments, depending on market conditions.  As a result, the combination of payments is de facto 
linked to the market price.  The considerable subsidies given to the crop insurance program are also 
linked to the market situation.  In such cases, the overall linkage of the payment to the quantities 
produced is unclear.  More generally, payments are only truly "decoupled" if the capital market is 
perfect, and if private consumption decisions are separable from the production side of the household.  
Several studies make it clear that to give a sum of money, even unconditionally, to a farmer 
necessarily influences the amount produced (Chavas and Holt 1990; Sumner 2003).  In reducing the 
risk of insolvency, even decoupled payments encourage higher production or riskier cultivation.   
There is often an implicit anticipation that cultivated areas will be used as a reference in the next 
reform which keeps land in cultivation.   
There are few solid quantitative results on the effect of such aid on production.  Abler and 
Blandford (2005) suggest that the effects on the quantities produced are limited.  However, some 35 
billion euros of EU direct aid, and some 30 billion dollars of US payments (OECD 2005b) are unlikely 
to be neutral on the world market.  Recent econometric work suggests that even decoupled payments 
have large indirect impacts on production in the US (Key et al 2005).  The results from most economic 
models suggest that developing countries can expect few gains even from a large reduction in these 
direct payments, but this conclusion is subject to uncertainty regarding the proper way to model these 
payments, which parallels the imperfect knowledge of their economic impact (Gohin 2005). 
 
5. Export subsidies  
EU export refunds. EU resistance to renouncing export subsidies has been one of the main 
blocking points during the Doha agricultural negotiations.  At an economic level, export subsidies are 
a very inefficient support instrument.  A large share of the money spent by the taxpayer benefits 
foreign consumers.  However, for the EU, renouncing the possibility of subsidizing exports is the same 
as renouncing the maintenance of an intervention price structurally higher than world prices for the 
many commodities for which it is now a net exporter:  European "refunds" are the keystone of the 
common market organizations.  The July 2004 agreement foresees the ending of export subsidies, 
although without an exact date (WTO 2004).  It is likely that this will require further adjustments in 
the Common Agricultural Policy, and in particular a further decrease in intervention prices.  
Have export subsidies (essentially EU subsidies in the last few years) had a very negative impact 
on developing countries?  Such subsidies face strong criticism from various non-governmental 
organizations that highlight the unfair and harsh competition in some industries: beef and poultry in 
West Africa, milk in Jamaica or in India.  These effects are real, especially as the amounts concerned 
can vary considerably from one year to the next according to the quantities which must be removed 
from the European market to support prices.  However, they are not uniform.  Developing countries 
which are net importers of food benefit from more favorable terms of trade.  They largely abstained 
from condemning too openly these export subsidies during the Doha round, because they reduce the 
price they pay for imports.  
A recent study by Gallezot and Bernard (2004) reviewed the amounts and destinations of 
European export subsidies.  It shows that they vary considerably according to the product but also to 
the destination, the main subsidies being granted to milk powder and sugar, those on beef and poultry 
now representing only limited quantities.  According to this study, subsidies are principally aimed at 
countries that are dependent on imports.  It is difficult, however, to assess the responsibility of these  10
subsidies for the inability of local farmers to develop local adequate agricultural production and it is 
undeniable that the subsidies are unfair competition for other potential suppliers.  
The end of export refunds. European subsidies have clearly limited trade in the South, depriving 
some countries with significant production potential of markets in nearby countries.  In some sectors, 
such as West African beef, these subsidies frequently represent half the cargo value.  Nevertheless, the 
removal of subsidies would not greatly alter the situation for developing countries, except for the 
particular cases underlined by the NGOs.  The assessments of Bouët et al (2005a) suggest that such 
removal will have an important effect on the world price only in the sugar and dairy product sectors.  
The end of refunds will hardly have any impact on those developing countries which sell their sugar 
higher than the world price in the framework of preferential quotas.  With dairy produce, only some 
developing countries like Argentina have a definite comparative advantage.  Subsidized exports of 
milk affect essentially West Africa, which historically does not have significant production potential.  
In short, the removal of such subsidies is desirable to end unfair competition, but the overall positive 
effect on developing countries must not be overestimated, and the consequences are, at least in the 
short term, negative for the net food importing countries.  
 
6. The effects of Doha 
Several recent assessments of the effect of a possible agricultural agreement under the Doha 
rounds have focused on developing countries (Anderson et al 2005).  The study by Bouët et al (2005a) 
considers carefully the preferential regimes granted to developing countries.  In particular, this study 
shows that the lowering of Most Favored Nation (MFN) duties by Northern countries erodes the 
preferences granted to sub Saharan Africa and modifies significantly the origin of EU imports.   
Countries such as Australia or Brazil would then replace some of the preferential exports of Africa, the 
Caribbean or the Andean countries.   
The reduction of internal support would have a more significant effect than other measures in the 
rice, cotton and, to a lesser degree, the cereal and oil crop sectors (Bouët et al, 2005a).  In the sugar 
sector, the removal of export subsidies would have the most significant impact.  In the other sectors, 
particularly fruit and vegetables, it is the lowering of tariffs which is most important.   
Apart from significant impacts on the world price of rice, milk and sugar, the price effects of the 
Doha round will be small.  Growth in production would certainly occur for developed countries in the 
Cairns group and, to a lesser extent, developing countries of the same group (Brazil, Argentina and 
Thailand particularly).  It is principally the exports of the Cairns group (and to a lesser degree, China 
and the East-Asian developing countries) which would increase, to the detriment of EU exports.   
African countries would see no significant growth in their exports, because they can already access the 
EU market with little tariff protection.  
The welfare effects in developing countries presented in Table 6 are the combination of changes 
in their terms of trade, allocative efficiency, and government revenues, as well as gains for agricultural 
producers and losses for consumers.  In Mediterranean countries and sub-Saharan countries, the 
welfare effect of the Doha Round would be negative.  In sub-Saharan countries, this is caused by the 
erosion of preferences, which leads to both lower rents and some trade diversion.  In Mediterranean 
countries, this is due to both the erosion of preferences and the deterioration of their terms of trade, 
caused by higher import prices for cotton (an input of the textile industry) and food products.  Other 
developing countries (Asian and some South American countries) would experience a net increase in 
welfare, but by a limited amount.  Some of the poorest countries, or at least some countries that 
include the largest number of the poor, such as India or Pakistan (part of "South Asia" in Table 6) 
experience a slight increase in welfare, mainly due to allocative efficiency gains generated by the 
elimination of their own domestic distortions.  However, others, also among the poorest, experience 
welfare losses.  This is the case of sub-Saharan Africa, which includes many of the least developed 
countries. 
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Note that the farm sector in sub-Saharan Africa benefits from higher world prices, even though 
trade liberalization hurts consumers.  This is not the case in South Asia, because of larger cuts in 
agricultural tariffs (an indication of the effects on the farm sector is given by the returns to agricultural 
land in Table  6).  This shows that the domestic risks would be different across countries: more 
expensive food for the urban population could lead to some instability in one case, while the risks 
could come from a stressed farm sector in the other case.  Recent studies focusing on the poverty 
impact of trade liberalization, which combine household surveys with economic models, also show the 
uneven consequences on different population groups (see e.g. Hertel and Winters 2005).  Welfare 
gains at the national level can even be compatible with a larger number of people below the poverty 
level (Bussolo et al 2004; Valenzuela et al 2005).  This calls for flexibility in implementing the 
measures in final Doha agreement, so that individual developing countries can adapt to the local 
situation.  Such flexibility is included in the special and differential treatment of the July 2004 
Framework Agreement (WTO 2004) and endorsed in the December 2005 outcome of the WTO 
Ministerial meeting in Hong Kong (WTO 2005), at least in a limited extent. 
 
7. Non tariff issues and developing countries  
The share of developing countries in world agri-food exports has continually decreased, from 
40% to 24% in thirty years.  Sub-Saharan Africa’s market share has declined from 9% to less than 3%, 
and consists essentially of raw or lightly processed products.  One reason is that developing countries 
have largely remained outside the phenomenon of intra-regional liberalization, which has increased 
trade within large areas of the world.  Neither African nor Asian regional integration has been very 
convincing and Mercosur integration remains incomplete.  Overall, developing countries continue to 
impose very high tariffs among themselves, often adding non transparent import taxes  and a 
multiplicity of bureaucratic obstacles.   Some estimates find that the gains for developing countries 
obtained by eliminating tariffs between themselves exceed the gains obtained by cutting developed 
countries tariffs (Anderson and Martin, 2005).  
Sanitary and technical issues.  Another reason for the lack of integration into the world market is 
because technical, sanitary and plant disease controls restrict agricultural and food exports from a 
large number of developing countries.  These problems are particularly acute with primary products, 
due to measures against epidemics, contagious diseases or invasive species.  For example, the EU 
prohibited the import of African fish and shellfish at the end of the 1990s for fear of cholera, severely 
handicapping one of this region’s few dynamic sectors.  Numerous countries that are not deemed to be 
free of foot and mouth disease cannot export animal products: for these, the opening of markets by an 
agreement within the Doha Round would be largely theoretical.  The phytosanitary barriers to the 
importation of fruit and vegetables are very restrictive and sometimes unpredictable, and lead to 
penalizing retention periods (this is also the case in Japan and Australia, see OECD, 1999).  
It might be thought that sanitary and pest control problems, especially questions of microbe 
contamination and invasive species, would be less of a problem for processed products.  These, 
however, do not gain easier entry to the European or American market. Indeed, standards imposed by 
the developed countries often concern the processing chain and not only the final quality of the 
product (Henson et al 2000).  Food firms must observe the technical standards and Hazard Analysis at 
Critical Control Points procedures which pose problems of cost, infrastructure and traceability for 
developing countries.  
The SPS Agreement (on sanitary and phytosanitary standards) states that more restrictive controls 
than those based on international standards must have scientific justification based on risk analysis.   
Nevertheless, the SPS Agreement has a limited value for developing countries, which have made only 
infrequent use of it to open markets.  The agreement favors countries which have accumulated 
significant expertise in the field of scientific evaluation used in arbitration cases, and because it only 
includes very minor references to economic issues, it allows developed countries to act against very  12
small risks.  The special and differential treatment for developing countries (Article 10 of the SPS 
agreement and Article 12 of the Technical Barriers to Trade or TBT agreement, which recommend 
giving consideration to the difficulties for developing countries to comply with Northern standards) 
has had little effect.  It is easily understood that, with public opinion so sensitive on matters of food 
safety, caution encourages very restrictive measures.  However, the fact is that technical conditions 
placed on the exports of developing countries are de facto obstacles which limit the effects of lowering 
customs tariffs.  
The increasing significance of private standards.  Perhaps a more significant phenomenon is 
that the standards governing international (and national) trade are increasingly beyond public control, 
which alone is capable of being the subject of international agreements. Increasingly, private players 
are imposing their own standards on importers and producers from developing countries (Reardon, 
2004).  These requirements exceed public regulations, particularly regarding production processes, 
certification and traceability, three areas where the poorest countries are especially handicapped by the 
lack of capital, infrastructure and skilled workers.  Moreover, private sector standards appear to 
amplify the effects of reputation, distributors in developed countries having not only to manage the 
risk but the media coverage of risk with public opinion.  It was found that, out of fear of potential 
risks, there are importers (e.g. those involved in school meals) who systematically refused supplies 
from developing countries despite a seemingly satisfactory bill of health (Bureau et al, 2004). 
In short, there is a set of factors not pertaining to negotiation on tariffs which considerably limit 
the integration of developing countries into the world market.  More generally, there are supply side 
constraints, such as infrastructure, capital and skilled labor constraints, that will limit considerably the 
impact of tariff concessions in the food sector.  Again, not all developing countries are affected in the 
same way.  For example, Blasetti and Piniero (2003) show that the food sector in Argentina and Brazil 
is confident of its capacity to respond to all EU technical and sanitary requirements in the near future, 
even if those on traceability pose some problems for Argentina exporters (it is also problematic for 
other developed countries).  Non-tariff factors seem to marginalize the poorest countries the most, and 
sub Saharan Africa in particular. 
 
8. Conclusion 
This paper highlighted the contrasting interests of various types of developing countries faced 
with the perspective of liberalization in the agricultural and food sector.  For most middle-income 
developing countries confronted with high protection in their main markets, liberalization can be a 
source of substantial growth in prospects and prices for a relatively high-performing export sector.  
For net food importing countries, including most of the LDCs and the small island developing states, 
and for cotton importing countries (North Africa, Bangladesh), agricultural trade liberalization may 
have overall negative consequences, because of terms of trade effects. For most sub-Saharan African 
countries and LDCs, negative consequences also result from the erosion of their preferential access to 
the EU and US markets.  For poorest countries, non-tariff issues and supply side constraints are likely 
to limit even further the possible expansion of their exports that could result from more open 
agricultural markets. 
These contrasting effects have long been underestimated.  They are now supported by a growing 
body of quantitative analyses that have challenged the idea that cutting agricultural tariffs and ending 
farm subsidies would benefit all developing countries.  However, showing that the situation is 
complex has not made the policy message simpler.  While it becomes clear that some of the poorest 
countries are likely to lose from an agricultural agreement in the Doha round, some of the 
beneficiaries include a large number of poor people (China, India, Brazil, Thailand).  In addition, in 
net food importing countries, the large losses for some agents are offset, at least partially, by gains for 
other agents (urban consumers vs farmers).   
The fact that some countries lose from the erosion of preferences is not a justification for 
rejecting the multilateral process of trade liberalization.  These negative consequences are limited in 
the case of LDCs, because these countries are only able to draw limited gains from the tariff  13
preferences they have been granted.  The losses are more significant for small islands that have 
specialized in the production of sugar and bananas under preferential access to the EU, but specific 
assistance measures can be more easily targeted on small sized countries. 
However, equity, as well as the need to gather a consensus for the continuation of a multilateral 
process, requires acknowledging the negative impacts, and looking for ways to compensate or reduce 
them.  Under WTO rules, special and differential treatment mainly consists of a lower level of 
obligations and longer implementation periods to phase in trade disciplines.  Basically, these are 
options for opting out of the liberalization process, and are unlikely to alleviate possible negative 
effects resulting from multilateral liberalization in third countries (Matthews, 2005).  If the 
international community wants to offset some of the negative effects of the Doha round, more 
ambitious and positive measures must be implemented than the provisions of the Uruguay Round 
Agreement on Agriculture, or the declarations of intention in the SPS and TBT agreements, or the 
1994 Declaration on Net Food Importing Developing Countries.  
Several forms of direct assistance for those countries adversely affected by trade liberalization 
have been proposed (Prowse 2005; Page 2005).  They include the constitution of special funds or the 
use of financial facilities.  The announcement by several donors of increased funding of ‘aid for trade’ 
measures at the WTO Hong Kong meeting is to be welcomed, even if it is unclear how much of this is 
genuinely new money as opposed to a reallocation of previously committed funds. The 1960’s 
conception of special and differential treatment, which relied heavily on trade preferences for 
developing countries, such as the GSP, is often seen as carrying too many unwanted consequences.  
The recent growth of criticism of trade preferences doubtless responds to anxieties as to their often 
arbitrary and even, in some cases, harmful character.  Countries excluded from the benefits of such 
agreements can legitimately feel wronged.  The fear of seeing preferences used in the defense of 
protectionist interests is another reason for distrust.  Finally, the argument that preferences can only be 
a short term policy, given the progressive reduction of multilateral tariffs and the reform of 
agricultural policies in developed countries, cannot be ignored.  However, these critiques of 
preferential regimes underestimate the growing difficulty of the poorest countries in the export of 
agricultural produce.  Their marginalization can only increase if no measures are taken in their favor.  
In this case, equality of treatment is not synonymous with fairness.  
Among the 150 WTO members, more than 100 are treated as developing countries.  The extent of 
their economic weakness, which special and differential treatment is supposed to address, varies 
greatly.  If special and differential treatment is seen as a form of adjustment to the outcome of the 
Doha negotiations, one must acknowledge that Brazil or China and Bangladesh or Mauritius will 
benefit very unevenly from the negotiations.   
If further differentiation between developing countries is sought, simple reference to historical or 
geographical criteria is arbitrary and inappropriate.  Only a more objective approach, contingent 
exclusively on widely accepted development criteria, would provide the basis for a redefinition of 
fairness in the international trading system.  In order to reach a fair agreement, the option of 
demanding that the countries that benefit most from the Doha round (including some developing 
countries), should apply low or zero tariffs on imports from the poorest, or the more vulnerable 
countries, should be explored.  If a set of intermediate countries also decided to grant GSP preferences 
to the poorest, for the latter, the expansion of their market could offset some of the losses caused by 
multilateral liberalization.  This would also help them benefit from increased access to the most 
rapidly growing markets, where quality standards are perhaps more accessible.  
The December 2005 decision in Hong Kong to grant duty-free and quota-free access to the 
market of developed and "developing countries in the position to do so" to LDCs  (WTO 2005) is in 
line with this idea.  The exact provisions are still to be defined.  It is unclear which countries would 
actually grant this preferences, what would be the exemptions (Japan already opposed access to its 
market for rice, the US for sugar, etc.) and how stringent would be the non-tariff (sanitary and 
phytosanitary) issues as well as the side conditions (rules of origin).  In addition, the system should 
also be designed so as to avoid a threshold between LDCs that are members of the WTO and those 
that are not, and between LDCs and countries that are only slightly less poor.  A more differentiated  14
list of countries carries the risk of adding complexity to an already overwhelmed multilateral regime.  
An option could be a coordinated reconsideration of all existing preferences, and the move towards a 
reformed GSP, which would differentiate more between countries so as to target those that benefit less 
from liberalization.  This would be perhaps the beginning of a multi speed system, more adapted to the 
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Table 1. Average tariffs applied by sector, per cent 
 
 EU  25  USA  Asia  Developed  EFTA  Cairns 
Developed 
Paddy rice  62.9  4.6  289.9  12.3  0.0 
Processed  rice  138.1 4.9 314.0  11.6  0.0 
Coarse grains  24.3  1.1  83.9  82.6  0.1 
Wheat 0.5  2.4  69.2  134.4  1.2 
Sugar  128.5 34.8 120.4 48.2  3.5 
Oilseeds 0.0  4.3  62.4  38.5  0.1 
Live animals  36.2  0.1  20.4  53.6  0.0 
Animal  products  4.3 0.6 9.9  33.7  8.3 
Meat 62.8  3.2  25.2  177.6  5.9 
Meat products  20.0  3.6  31.8  167.9  30.4 
Dairy  products  39.6 18.8 40.2 91.7 76.6 
Fibers  0.0 1.6 0.2 0.0 0.0 
Fruits & vegetables  17.9  2.7  17.1  31.8  1.7 
Other  crops  2.3 2.7 3.7  20.0  1.4 
Fats  4.6 3.5 4.2  36.2  2.1 
Beverage Tobacco  13.7  2.4  13.1  15.9  7.2 
Food 10.1  4.2  12.6  20.8  6.8 
Total  agrofood  16.7  4.7  22.5 47.7 10.8 
Source: MacMap_HS6,using  ad valorem equivalents. The figures indicate the percentage tariff, weighted by the 
exports of a reference group of countries so as to account for the relative importance of each product without suffering from 
the well known endogeneity bias of regular trade weighted averages.  
 
 
Table 2. Average applied bilateral tariffs in the agricultural sector, per cent 
 
Tariffs applied  by Æ 
 
applied to ↓ 
EU 25  USA  Asia developed  EFTA  Cairns 
developed 
EU  25  -  5.8  22.2 52.0 15.7 
USA 16.2  -  28.9  57.9  5.1 
Asia developed  12.5  3.7  -  17.9  6.2 
EFTA 7.9  3.9  11.6  -  10.6 
Cairns developed  25.9  3.4  24.9  79.8  - 
Mediterranean 7.3  4.0  14.1  25.7  3.7 
Sub-Saharan  Africa  6.7 3.0  12.0  8.9 0.7 
Cairns developing  18.3  3.8  24.0  34.7  5.9 
China 13.5  5.1  21.7  36.7  8.7 
South Asia  14.4  1.8  33.7  21.9  1.8 
Rest of the World  15.1  2.1  17.4  25.8  2.6 
Average  16.7  4.7  22.5 47.7 10.8 










Imports eligible, by 
regime, 1000 USD 
Actual import under 
the regime 
1000 USD 
Apparent rate of 
utilization 




[1]  [2]  [3]=[2]/[1]  Imports under any of the 4 
preferential regimes / [1] 
Total  4 136 950  3 606 911  87%   
AGOA  161 928  137 202  85%  85% 
ATPA  959 224  408 319  43%  65% 
CBI  1 689 600  1 629 023  96%  99% 
GSP (regular)  2 455 655  1 415 038  58%  94% 
GSP-LDCs 83  010*  17  329  21%  87% 
      
* excluding eligibility to regular GSP. Source: computation by authors from USITC data, based on CIF imports for 2002, 
chapters 1 to 24 of the HS96. The effective rate of utilization is constructed as the ratio of imports under any preference to 
the imports eligible for a given preference. AGOA is the Africa Growth Opportunity Act. ATPA indicates the Andean Trade 
Preference Act.  CBI is the Caribbean Basin Initiative (now CBERA and CBTPA)  20









Actual Import under 
regime 
1000 Euros 
Apparent rate of 
utilization 
 
Effective rate of utilization 
NON RECIPROCAL 
REGIMES 
[1]  [2]  [3]=[2]/[1]  Imports under any of the 4 
preferential regimes / [1]  
Total  18 609 825  12 292 289  89%   
Cotonou (ACP)  5 926 849  5 500 091  92.8%  95% 
GSP (regular)  8 754 532  4 385 644  50.1%  86% 
GSP-Drug  1 833 684  1 714 354  93.5%  95% 
E.B.A   1 682 244  293 527  17.4%  96% 
        
Source: Computations by J. Gallezot, from Taxud (Single administrative declaration) and TARIC data, based on CIF 
imports data for 2002, chapters 1 to 24 of the HS96. The effective rate of utilization is constructed as the ratio of imports 
under any preference to the imports eligible to a given reference. GSP Drug indicates the special GSP provisions for 
countries combating drug trafficking. EBA is the Everything but Arms Initiative. MFN stands for Most Favored Nation  
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Table 5. EU and US imports of agro-food products under various regimes, year 2002 
 




EUROPEAN UNION    Millions 
€ o $ 
 
Preferential imports from developing
countries 
 13  316  20.01% 
Non reciprocal preferences  0   
Cotonou  Africa, Caribbean, Pacific  5 500  8.26% 
GSP (excluding East Europe)  Almost all developing countries 4 257  6.40% 
SGP "plus" (drugs)   Countries  fighting  drug
trafficking 
1 714  2.58% 
Everything but arms   Least  developed  (except
Myanmar) 
294 0.44% 
Others Overseas  territories.  399  0.60% 
Reciprocal preferencess        
Bilateral agreements with
developing countries 
Maghreb, Mashrek, etc.  1 153  1.73% 
Imports under a zero MFN duty from
developing countries 
All developing countries  15 567  23.39% 
Imports under a non zero MFN duty from developing countries  11 724  17.61% 
Total imports from developing countries  40 737  61.20% 
Total EU imports  66 559  100.00% 
      
UNITED STATES       
Preferential imports from developing and emerging countries  7 607  12.70% 
Non reciprocal preferences     
Africa Growth Opportunity Act  Sub Saharan Africa  137  0.23% 
Andean Trade Promotion Act  4 andean countries  408  0.68% 
Caribbean  Basin  Initiative  Caribbean and Central
America 
1 629  2.72% 
GSP (except Eastern Europe)  Most developing countries  1 350  2.25% 
GSP for LDCs  US list of LDCs  17  0.03% 
Reciprocal preferences       
Bilateral agreements with
developing countries 
Jordan, Gaza, Chili, etc.  22  0.04% 
Mexico under the NAFTA  Mexico  4 044  6.75% 
Imports under a zero MFN duty from developing countrie  20 811  34.74% 
Imports under a non zero MFN duty from developing countries  14  0.02% 
Total imports from developing countries  28 417  47.43% 
Total US imports    59 910  100.00% 
Source: Authors using data from Gallezot, souceTaxud and TARIC-Eurostat and from USITC. Figures for 2002, Chapters 1 to 24 of the Harmonized 




Table 6. Impact of an agreement on agriculture in the Doha round (percentage changes 
compared to a 2005 reference) 
 
  Changes in food 
and agricultural 
production 
Agri-food Exports  Agri-food Imports  Returns to 
agricultural land 
Changes in global 
welfare 
EU  25  -1.57  2.7  12.8 -15.06 0.14 
USA -1.05  0.8  2.8  -0.21  0.05 
Asia  Developed  -2.08 11.8  9.6  -1.79 0.05 
EFTA -2.73  -3.8  3.7  1.10  -0.11 
Cairns  Developed  3.66 12.8  2.8  1.08 0.04 
Mediterranean 0.73  8.8  -1.5  0.77  -0.16 
Cairns  Developing  1.25 10.4 -0.7 0.60 0.00 
China  0.01 13..2 10.1 0.30 0.15 
RoW 0.64  6.8  -0.7  1.15  -0.10 
South Asia  -0.01  6.4  7.8  -0.10  0.17 
SubSaharan Africa  0.76  4.7  -0.8  0.22  -0.03 
World -0.39  6.1  6.0  -  0.08 
Source : Bouët et al  2005a. 
 